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NOTE
KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM:
THE FUTURE OF ATS LITIGATION
R. Ethan Hargravest
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court handed down a historic decision:
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.' The Court's decision concerned the
interpretation of a statute whose text is nearly as old as the United States
itself: the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 2 The ATS allows aliens to bring suit for
violations of the law of nations in an American court.' For almost 200 years
after its enactment, the ATS saw limited application, but all of that changed
with the decision of a Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1980 allowing the
ATS to be applied to claims for international human rights abuses
committed abroad. For the next several decades, litigants from all over the
globe used the ATS to seek redress of such injuries in the federal courts of
the United States.' Almost ten years ago, the Supreme Court attempted to
rein in the broad discretion of the lower federal courts to recognize causes
of action in violation of the law of nations,' but to little avail. In Kiobel, the
Court applied a rule of statutory construction to the ATS for the first time,
holding that the courts could not use the ATS to recognize causes of action
based on conduct that occurred beyond the sovereignty of the United
t Editor-in-Chief, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 8. J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law, May 2014; B.A., English Literature, Bryan College, 2011. 1 dedicate
this Note to my Savior Jesus Christ, without whom I would have no purpose in life. I
dedicate this Note to every person who invested in the cultivation of my professional and
academic pursuits-not the least of whom are my parents, Gary and Carole Hargraves. And
finally, I dedicate this Note to my beautiful wife, Alanna, without whom this work and so
much else in my life would not have been possible.
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. The Alien Tort Statute was included as part of the First Congress's Judiciary Act of
1789. See infra note 8.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.D.
5. Id.
6. The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), mandated that
the lower courts should exercise "great caution in adapting the law of nations to private
rights." Id. at 728.
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States.! The Court's decision should have been the death knell to a majority
of cases traditionally brought under the ATS, but there is anything but
uniformity in the application of Kiobel by the lower courts. Many lower
courts acknowledge that Kiobel has changed ATS litigation, but the nature
and extent of the change is already a point of contention. The
interpretations of many lower courts leave the door of the ATS wide open,
despite the Supreme Court's attempt to close it in Kiobel. The Supreme
Court has spoken on the future of ATS litigation; now it falls to the lower
courts to properly apply that decision.
This Note addresses the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel and what
that decision means for ATS litigation. Part II of this Note presents the
history of the ATS, covering its origin as well as the trend of modern cases
as it began in 1980 and highlighting the differences between the traditional
and modern implementations of the ATS. Part III of this Note addresses the
Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel. Part IV examines how Kiobel's
language has since been interpreted by the lower federal courts and why
most of those decisions have missed the mark. Part V of this Note offers a
commonsense interpretation of Kiobel already adopted by at least one
district court, and demonstrates how, if the lower federal courts continue in
their current trend of ignoring the proper interpretation of Kiobel, the ATS
could once again return to life despite the Supreme Court's attempt to put it
to rest.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin of the Alien Tort Statute
Although currently and primarily referred to as the Alien Tort Statute,
the provision was originally described as the Alien Tort Clause and was
included in § 9 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789-the act that created the
judicial system of the United States and defined the boundaries of its
jurisdiction.' In its original form the Clause gave district courts jurisdiction
"concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the
7. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
8. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collIld=1sl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=200.
9. 46 Mass. Prac., Federal Civil Practice § 1:2 ("In enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Congress established a framework for the federal court system and further defined the
federal courts' jurisdictional boundaries, which had been set forth rather ambiguously in the
Constitution.").
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case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."" The Supreme Court has
since clarified that the ATS is "a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action."" In other words, the language of the statute "besp[eaks] a
grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law." 2
The Alien Tort Clause arose out of the need to fill a particular void in the
judicial authority of the United States courts"-the inability to adjudicate
infractions against the law of nations." The Founders, familiar with the
works of Blackstone, understood that there was an obligation among
civilized nations to recognize through domestic law "those principles of
natural justice."" It was these principles that the newborn judicial system of
the United States found itself unable to protect. This embarrassing lack of
judicial authority led the first Congress to issue a resolution asking the
states to provide the necessary forums for adjudication of such infractions.'"
Unfortunately, the resolution failed to spur the states into action, leaving
the fledgling judicial system impotent." It was then that the primary
historical catalyst for the Alien Tort Clause appeared: the Marbois incident.
In 1784, Charles Julian De Longchamps was criminally indicted on the
charge of making and executing a threat of physical harm against Francis
Barbe Marbois, "Consul General of France to the United States, Consul for
the State of Pennsylvania, [and] Secretary of the French Legation."" De
Longchamps was arrested, tried, and found guilty of violating the law of
nations, which the court declared to be a part of the common law of the
State.' 9 The court imposed a fine and a two-year prison term on De
10. Judiciary Act, supra note 8.
11. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
12. Id. at 713 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 447, 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed., 1961)).
13. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221, 226-27 (1996) (explaining how a 1781
Congressional resolution sought to remedy the lack of Congressional authority over
infractions against the law of nations); see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims
Act: Theoretical and Historical Foundations of the Alien Tort Claims Act and Its Discontents:
A Reality Check, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 585, 588 (2004).
14. Dodge, supra note 13.
15. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67.
16. Dodge, supra note 13.
17. Id. at 229.
18. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1784 WL 85 (Pa. 0. & T. Oct. 1784).
19. Id.
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Longchamps,20 but in all of this there was no civil remedy available to
Marbois. Congress was effectively forced to apologize to Marbois for its
inability to provide a civil remedy and again recommended that the states
-"pass laws for the exemplary punishment of such persons as may in future
by violence or by insult attack the dignity of sovereign powers in the person
of their ministers or servants."'2 1 The Marbois incident revealed the need for
a federal remedy, one that would not merely punish the violation but
would, as the 1781 resolution stated, "'authorise suits to be instituted for
damages by the party injured."'22 Five years after the Marbois incident,
Congress provided such a remedy as part of the First Judiciary Act of
1789-the Alien Tort Clause.
B. The Text of the Alien Tort Statute
To fully understand the evolution from the traditional to the modern
applications of the Alien Tort Clause, it is first necessary to understand the
evolution from the traditional to the modern interpretations of some key
terms in the text of the Clause itself. The Alien Tort Clause changed slightly
over the years, but in its current statutory form it still provides the federal
courts with "jurisdiction [over] any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."23 Critical to a proper understanding of the Alien Tort Clause are the
phrases "law of nations" and "tort only." The Supreme Court has held that
by using the term "tort only" the drafters of the ATS meant to denote a
specific subset of violations against the law of nations that implicated "a
judicial remedy and at the same time threaten[ed] serious consequences in
international affairs."2 4 Probably the best example of such a "tort" is the one
committed in the Marbois Incident, where the tort itself (assault) was made
a violation of the law of nations by the fact that it was committed against an
ambassador of a foreign nation.25 It was such a tort that "if not adequately
redressed could rise to an issue of war."26 Thus, the term "tort only" was
20. Id. at 118.
21. Dodge, supra note 13, at 229-30 (quoting 28 Journals of the Continental Congress
1774-1789 at 315).
22. Id. at 227 (quoting 21 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 at 1137).
23. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West).
24. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
25. See generally Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1784 WL 85 (Pa. 0. & T. Oct. 1784).
26. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
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meant, among other things,27 to limit the jurisdiction of the ATS to only
those individual, redressable injuries that were also violations of the law of
nations.28
The more difficult phrase in terms of interpretation has been "the law of
nations." The difficulty is surprising given the general consensus on what
exactly the phrase was meant to invoke-a part of the general common
law.29 The Supreme Court in Sosa recognized that our understanding of the
law of nations, particularly with respect to the violations that would be
actionable under the ATS, continues to be informed primarily by the
writings of Sir William Blackstone.30 The Court recognized three specific
offenses against the law of nations that Blackstone had indicated carried a
kind of personal liability: violations of safe conduct; infringements upon the
rights of ambassadors; and, the crime of piracy." Blackstone did not
describe these as the only offenses against the law of nations that carried
personal liability; rather, he described them as three specific offenses that
were made violations of the law of nations by an underlying
characteristic-the fact that they were "incident to whole states or
nations.""
27. A Pennsylvania district court indicated merely four years after the Judiciary Act of
1789 that an action for replevin could not come under the purview of the Alien Tort Clause
because it was not an action for a "tort only." Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D.
Pa. 1793). The court there intimated that the phrase "tort only" may have been intended at
least in part to limit the ATS to cases for civil damages. Id. See also Joseph Modeste Sweeney,
A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 445, 447
(1995) (asserting that the phrase "tort only" referred to the law of prize and was meant in
part to limit the jurisdiction of the ATS to cases involving redress of the civil wrong to the
exclusion of cases involving the legitimacy of a prize).
28. The Court in Sosa asserted that there were three areas of violations against the law of
nations: "general norms governing the behavior of national states with each other," Sosa, 542
U.S. at 714; "a body of judge-made law regulating the conduct of individuals situated outside
domestic boundaries," Id. at 715; and "a sphere in which these rules binding individuals for
the benefit of other individuals overlapped with the norms of state relationships." Id. The
Court indicated that it was only this last category, where individual rights overlapped with
norms of state relationships, that was implicated by the use of the limiting term "tort only."
Id.
29. Id. at 739 ("The law of nations that would have been applied in [ATS cases] was at
the time part of the so-called general common law.").
30. Id. at 715.
31. Id.
32. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68.
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As part of being "incident to whole states or nations" these three offenses
carried the distinct threat of subjecting nations to the risk of war.33 In each
case the potential of the offense to carry a risk of war had nearly everything
to do with the nationalities and statuses of the parties involved;" an offense
committed against an ambassador to a foreign nation is made a violation of
the law of nations by the very fact that it is committed against an
ambassador to a foreign nation," where logically the same offense
committed against a non-alien who is not an ambassador from another
country would simply be an assault. In the same way, a violation of the safe
passage rights of an alien is a violation by the fact that it is committed
against a foreign citizen." Likewise, the crime of piracy is made a violation
of the law of nations by the fact that the perpetrator simultaneously
renounces his citizenship and declares war on all nations.37
These three offenses constitute the clearest examples of specific
violations of the law of nations that would have been present in the minds
of the men who drafted the original text of the Alien Tort Clause, but they
do not constitute the entirety of the law of nations. Blackstone defined the
law of nations generally as "a system of rules, deducible by natural reason,
and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the
world."" But Blackstone went on to say that no individual nation "can
dictate or prescribe the rules of this law" to the other nations because they
"must necessarily result from those principles of natural justice, in which all
the learned of every nation agree."39 And in the construction of those
general principles, or treaties as the case may be, "there is also no judge to
resort to, but the law of nature and reason."' It was these principles that the
Alien Tort Clause incorporated by its reference to the law of nations-these
33. Id.
34. See Id. at 69 ("[Dluring the continuance of any safe-conduct, either express or
implied, the foreigner is under the protection of the king and the law." (emphasis added)).
35. See Id. at 70.
36. Id. at 68-69.
37. Id. at 71. ("[T]herefore [the pirate] has renounced all the benefits of society and
government, and has reduced himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war
against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him.").
38. Id. at 66.
39. Id. at 66-67. Such rules may also be found in the "mutual compacts or treaties"
between nations. Id.
40. Id. at 67.
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principles that supplied the causes of action for the Clause from its very first
use.41
C. The Early Days ofATS Litigation
The first reported use of the Alien Tort Clause came only four years after
its inception, in Moxon v. The Fanny." The case arose out of a capture at sea
of the British vessel The Fanny by French privateers."3 The French vessel
effected the capture "within the territorial jurisdiction and under the
protection of the United States."" The libellant, representing the owners of
the captured vessel, argued that the court had jurisdiction pursuant to the
Alien Tort Clause." The court rejected this argument based upon a strict
reading of the text of the Clause; the court reasoned that, as the libellant was
pursuing restitution of property (The Fanny) in addition to damages for the
tort of marine trespass, the action was not one "for a tort only.""
The next mention of the Alien Tort Clause came just two years after The
Fanny in Bolchos v. Darrel,4'where one Captain Bolchos had captured a
Spanish ship and brought it into a South Carolina port." On board the ship
were slaves belonging to one Savage, whose agent, Edward Darrel, seized
and sold them once the ship came into port.4 ' Bolchos, a French citizen,
sued for restitution of the slaves pursuant to a treaty between the United
States and France.so The common law court of the state dismissed the action
as belonging under admiralty jurisdiction." The district court agreed that
the action came under its admiralty jurisdiction, but in its dicta the court
41. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004) ("[T]he ATS was intended to
have practical effect the moment it became law, on the understanding that the common law
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations
thought to carry personal liability at the time.").
42. Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 943.
46. Id. at 948 (emphasis added) ("It cannot be called a suit for a tort only, when the
property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are sought for.").
47. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
2013] 7
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indicated that there would also have been jurisdiction under § 9 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789-the Alien Tort Clause.s2
Bolchos and The Fanny were the first judicial decisions mentioning the
Alien Tort Clause since its creation, but in neither case did the court
actually exercise jurisdiction under the Clause. In fact, from its creation in
1789 up to June of 1961, the Clause was used in only five cases, and in none
of them was jurisdiction sustained." The next of those five cases came in
1908 when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in O'Reilly de
Camara v. Brooke." In O'Reilly, the plaintiff, a Spanish subject and a
resident of then United States-controlled Cuba, claimed a right to slaughter
cattle and receive compensation in connection with the office of "high
sheriff of Havana," which he said was his by descent." The office of high
sheriff had been abolished-leaving the plaintiff without a livelihood or
compensation. 7 The tort alleged by the plaintiff to satisfy the tort
requirement of the Alien Tort Statute" was that of disseisin-an assertion
that he had been "wrongfully depriv[ed] ... of the freehold possession of
property."" The Court found several "technical difficulties" that required a
dismissal of the plaintiffs claim, but two were specifically related to the lack
of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute: first, the plaintiff had failed to
establish that the tort of disseisin had been committed;60 second, even if the
tort of disseisin had been committed, there was no affirmative proof that
the tort of disseisin came within the meaning of the Alien Tort Statute-no
52. Id.
53. The court in Moxon v. The Fanny expressly stated that the Alien Tort Clause did not
supply jurisdiction, 17 F. Cas. at 947-48, and while the court in Bolchos v. Darrel implied in
dicta that jurisdiction under the Clause could have been sustained, 3 F. Cas. at 810, it did not
actually hold as much.
54. See O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908); Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v.
Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960); Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390
(D.D.C. 1958); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F.
Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
55. 209 U.S. 45 (1908).
56. Id. at 48-49.
57. Id. at 49.
58. The Alien Tort Clause of the Judiciary Act had been re-codified as Revised Statute §
563(16), which gave the district courts "jurisdiction 'of all suits brought by any alien for a
tort 'only' in violation of the law of nations, or of a treaty of the United States.'" Id. at 48
(quoting Rev. Stat. § 563 (16)).
59. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 541 (9th ed. 2010).
60. O'Reilly, 209 U.S. at 50-51.
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proof that it was, under these circumstances, a tort "in violation of the law
of nations or of [a] treaty [of the United States].""
The rule that emerges from these first three cases (The Fanny, Bolchos,
and O'Reilly) is that jurisdiction under the ATS will attach only where: (1)
the plaintiff establishes that a tort has been committed; (2) the plaintiff
establishes that something about the particular tort has caused it to violate a
principle of the law of nations or a treaty between the United States and
another country; and (3) the plaintiff seeks redress in damages and not in
any other remedy."2
In 1960, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited Bolchos as "[t]he only
case [we] have found in which jurisdiction was sustained on the basis of
[the Alien Tort Clause] even in part,"63 but it was not until 1961 that
jurisdiction under the ATS was truly sustained for the first time, in the case
of Adra v. Clift.' In Adra, the plaintiff, a Lebanese National, brought suit
against his ex-wife, an Iraqi National but a resident of Baltimore,
Maryland.6 1 Plaintiff Adra alleged that his ex-wife wrongfully deprived him
of the custody of their daughter by fraudulently including her on the
defendant's Iraqi passport, even though the daughter was actually a
Labanese National, and by bringing her to the United States. Without
reference to a single case or a treatise on common law torts, the court
concluded that "[t] he unlawful taking or withholding of a minor child from
the custody of the parent or parents entitled to such custody is a tort."67 The
fact that Adra sought equitable relief instead of the traditional tort remedy
of damages presented no additional obstacle to the court's designation.68
Finally, the court found that, as passports were a form of political
document, which by their "nature and object [are] addressed to foreign
61. Id. at 51. The court reasoned that disseisin did not come within the meaning of the
ATS-being in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States-because "it is
impossible for the courts to declare an act a tort of that kind when the Executive, Congress,
and the treaty-making power all have adopted the act." Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
62. See Id. at 45; Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17
F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
63. Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1960)
(emphasis added).
64. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
65. Id. at 859.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 862.
68. Id. at 863 ("The award of monetary damages is the customary remedy for most torts,
but other forms of relief for torts are not unheard of.").
2013] 9
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powers," the falsification of information on a passport constituted an
offense against not only the laws of the individual nations involved but also
an offense against the law of nations. 9
In 1948, the ATS had been codified in its final form, 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
which provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."o It was in that form that the court
in Adra first sustained ATS jurisdiction, and it was in that form that the
statute was brought before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case
that would change the face of ATS litigation-perhaps forever.
D. The Modern Trend
In 1980, nearly 200 years after the Alien Tort Clause was conceived, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.n It was in
Filartiga that a litigant first successfully applied the founding-era statute to
an entirely modern concept-the domestic adjudication of international
human rights violations. The claim in Filartiga was that the defendant
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, a former General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay, had kidnapped, tortured, and killed one Joelito Filartiga.72 The
plaintiffs in the case, citizens of Paraguay and the family of the late Joelito
Filartiga, asserted a claim of wrongful death against Pena to recover
compensatory and punitive damages." The court held that the act of
torture, committed by a state official, came under the jurisdiction of the
ATS as a tort in violation of the law of nations:
69. Id. at 864-65.
70. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West). The modern form of the statute differs in one important
way-it no longer allows for "concurrent" jurisdiction with the state courts, but vests
"original jurisdiction" in the district courts. This shift likely demonstrates the increased
concern that matters implicating foreign relations be handled by the federal courts rather
than the individual state courts. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Questions of this nature are fraught with implications for the nation as a whole, and
therefore should not be left to the potentially varying adjudications of the courts of the fifty
states."); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 156 (2d ed. 1996)
("Foreign affairs are national affairs. The United States is a single nation-state and it is the
United States (not the states of the Union, singly or together) that has relations with other
nations ... and makes national foreign policy."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay).
71. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 878.
73. Id. at 879.
10 [Vol. 8:1
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[D]eliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus,
whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by
an alien within our borders, [the Alien Tort Statute] provides
federal jurisdiction."4
The court based its holding in part on "the renunciation of torture as an
instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the world (in
principle if not in practice)."" The court's holding had several specific
ramifications: (1) the court established human rights violations, specifically
torture by a state official, as violative of the law of nations; (2) the court
made such conduct actionable as a tort under the ATS; 6 and (3) the court
employed a framework whereby it could "interpret international law not as
it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the
world today."" Each of these would be radical enough alone, but the court
did not stop there; possibly the most significant portion of the holding was
the categorical statement, "It is not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a
tort claim arising outside of its territorial jurisdiction."7 ' The court in
Filartiga intimated that, as long as personal jurisdiction could be satisfied
(by in-state service of process), it did not matter who the parties were nor
where the conduct occurred.79 This implicit authorization of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, coupled with the court's expansive view of the law of nations,80
started what-compared to the ATS's pre-Filartiga use-was a landslide of
74. Id. at 878.
75. Id. at 880.
76. Id. at 878.
77. Id. at 881.
78. Id. at 885.
79. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
80. In Filartiga, the court recited the mantra that "the law of nations ... has always been
part of the federal common law," Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885, but the court actually interpreted
the law of nations devoid of any reference to federal common law. Instead, the court called
for resort to evolving standards of international law. Id. at 881 ("Thus it is clear that courts
must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
the nations of the world today."). In divining these standards, the court in Filartiga said "the
courts are not to prejudge the scope of the issues that the nations of the world may deem
important to their interrelationships, and thus to their common good." Id. at 888.
2013] 11
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international human rights cases." Many of those cases had little to no
connection to the United States.
The holding of Filartiga had an immediate and noticeable effect on ATS
litigation, such that within four years the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia exclaimed, "section 1350 appears to be generating an
increasing amount of litigation."" Within five years after Filartiga, the ATS
was used sixteen times-a stark contrast to the two references in dictum
that it received in the first six years after its creation.83 In fact, in the entire
191 years prior to Filartiga, the statute was used only twenty-one times."
Since Filartiga, the ATS has been a favorite of international human rights
litigants. In its modern form, litigants have attempted to use the ATS to
combat foreign governments for terrorist attacks on their citizens, 5 sustain
wrongful death actions against foreign military officials, 6 prosecute war
81. Here is a non-exhaustive list of post-Filartiga ATS cases: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th
Cir. 2008); Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d
Cir. 2008); Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007); Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767 (6th
Cir. 2007); Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005); Aldana v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005); Flores v. S. Peru Copper
Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002);
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994);
Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988); Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S'holder Derivative Litig.,
792 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Colo. 2004); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp.
2d 86 (D.D.C. 2003); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2003);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
82. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, Circuit
Judge, concurring).
83. See Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas.
942, 943, 947-48 (D. Pa. 1793).
84. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4 n.15 (1985).
85. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
86. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1469, 1473
(9th Cir. 1994).
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crimes and crimes against humanity, 7 prosecute the aiding and abetting of
genocide," and the list goes on."
The ATS litigation continued in this vein with no serious limitation on
the power of the courts to recognize new causes of action until Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain." In Sosa, the Supreme Court finally addressed the
substance of the centuries-old ATS, primarily to settle the question of
whether and to what extent the federal courts could continue to supply
causes of action for the jurisdictional statute." The Court refused to place a
categorical limitation on courts recognizing new causes of action as they
had been doing since Filartiga, but the Court nonetheless warned, "the
possible collateral consequences of making international rules privately
actionable argue for judicial caution."92 The Court then attempted to place
the first real limitation on the creation of causes of action under the ATS
since the statute's rebirth in Filartiga: "federal courts should not recognize
private claims under federal common law for violations of any international
law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations
than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted." 3 This so-
called limitation was ultimately more effective on paper than in practice and
had the effect of keeping the door wide open as to what causes of action
were available under the ATS, subject only to what the Court described as
"vigilant doorkeeping." Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring
87. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2008).
88. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247-48, 251
(2d Cir. 2009).
89. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (violation of human
rights in the form of "murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment");
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009) (violation of human rights in the
form of nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (violation of human rights in the form of
imprisonment, torture, and mass-killings); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir.
1995) (violation of human rights in the form of "brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution,
forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution"); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 702-03, 723 (9th Cir. 1992) (violation of human rights in the form
of kidnapping and torture).
90. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
91. Id. at 714 ("[H]olding the ATS jurisdictional raises a new question, this one about
the interaction between the ATS at the time of its enactment and the ambient law of the
era.").
92. Id. at 727.
93. Id. at 732.
94. Id. at 729.
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in the judgment, described this so-called limitation as effectively "wag[ging]
a finger at the lower courts for going too far, and then-repeating the same
formula the ambitious lower courts themselves have used-invit[ing] them
to try again."" And try again they did.
The trend of cases post-Sosa looked largely unchanged.96 In fact, if the
trend changed at all, it actually grew." Courts continued to exercise
discretion in the creation of new causes of action. They continued to
recognize human rights violations as a tort in violation of the law of nations,
and they continued to apply the ATS extraterritorially. In April of 2013,
however, the Supreme Court rendered a long-awaited decision that will
likely change the face of ATS litigation forever.
III. KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM
A. Kiobel's Holding
This landmark decision arose out of a claim by Nigerian nationals that
certain foreign corporations had aided and abetted the Nigerian
government in "committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.""
The district court dismissed some of the claims of the Nigerian plaintiffs,
which prompted an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit.99 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "law of nations [did] not
recognize corporate liability," and, therefore, it dismissed the entire
complaint."o0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 17, 2011 to
consider that question."o' After oral arguments, however, the Court ordered
the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the question of "' [w]hether and
under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows
95. Id. at 739, 750.
96. John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Sec'y of State, Enforcing Human
Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, the 2008
Jonathan I. Charney Lecture in International Law Presented at Vanderbilt University Law
School on April 11, 2008, in 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2 (2009) ("ATS litigation continues
largely unabated, despite the Supreme Court's attempt in Sosa to rein it in.").
97. A search of the WestlawNext case database, using the search term "'Alien Tort
Statute' OR 'Alien Tort Claims Act,"' yields a result of 684 cases published between June 29,
2004-when Sosa was decided-and April 17, 2013-when Kiobel was decided.
98. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
99. Id. at 1663.
100. Id.
101. Kiobelv. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
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courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States.""02 The Court heard oral arguments again, this time on the issue of
the supplemental briefing, then rendered its decision based solely upon its
answer to that question-whether the jurisdiction of the ATS should
extend abroad.'03 Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous
decision of the Court,"0 in which the Court applied a rule of statutory
interpretation to the ATS and held that the jurisdiction of the statute could
not reach conduct within a foreign nation.'s
The Court's analysis followed a relatively simple path. The rule of
statutory interpretation known as the "presumption against
extraterritorial [ity]"o 6 mandates that .' [w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none. "'107 The
presumption limits the jurisdiction of the courts to domestic conditions,
unless Congress has evidenced a clear intent for a statute to apply abroad.'0o
The Court applied the presumption to the ATS and then examined the text,
history, and purpose of the statute to determine if there was sufficient
evidence of Congressional intent to overcome the presumption.' The
Court found that there was no such evidence."o The Court's determination,
which relied entirely on the statute itself and not on the particular facts of
the case, was that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the
ATS, thus preventing courts from recognizing a cause of action under the
statute based on conduct that occurred abroad."' The Court's decision was
quite clear as to the limitation of this presumption on the ATS; however, in
the last paragraph of the opinion, the Court opined on the potential for
cases that, unlike the one before it, had some significant connection to the
102. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012).
103. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
104. Id. at 1662. Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Breyer each wrote opinions concurring in
the judgment. Id. at 1669-70.
105. Id. at 1669 ("[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under
the ATS.").
106. Id. at 1664.
107. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Morrison v. Nat'1 Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2878 (2010)).
108. Id. at 1665.
109. Id. at 1665-67.
110. Id. at 1667.
111. Id. at 1669 ("We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.").
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United States. The text of that final paragraph, which has since been seized
upon by lower courts, reads as follows:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the
United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.
See Morrison, 561 U.S. --- , 130 S. Ct., at 2883-2888.
Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If
Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific
than the ATS would be required.'1 2
The Court's opinion up to that point had appeared to mandate a bright-line
test for cases under the ATS that were based on conduct occurring
abroad-there would be no jurisdiction in such cases; however, this last
paragraph called all of that into question by using what seemed like the
language of a narrow exception. And that is exactly how some lower courts
have since interpreted the final paragraph.
B. The Aftershock of Kiobel
In a decision on July 25, 2013-a little more than three months after
Kiobel-the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama described Kiobel as a "seismic shift" that has fundamentally altered
"the legal landscape" of ATS litigation."' There is no question that Kiobel
has changed the landscape, but what exactly that change is has been a
matter of some dispute in the lower courts. Some courts have assumed that
the touch and concern language from Kiobel requires a judicial
determination on a case-by-case basis of whether the specific defendant's
conduct touches and concerns the territory of the United States with
sufficient force." 4 Out of all the post-Kiobel decisions, only two have
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960 at *1 (N.D. Ala.
July 25, 2013).
114. See, e.g., Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Salvation Army, No. 3:13CV289-WS, 2013 WL
2432947 at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 3, 2013) ("[T]he allegedly unlawful denial of humanitarian aid
in Nigeria does not 'touch' or 'concern' the United States in such a way that would overcome
the ATS's presumption against extraterritoriality."); Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
No. 09-1289 (BAH), 2013 WL 2370594 at *14 (D.D.C. May 31, 2013) ("Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion for the majority left open the possibility that conduct that 'touch[es] and
concern[s] the territory of the United States ... with sufficient force to displace the
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claimed to find just the right facts to "displace" the presumption against
extraterritoriality."'5 But the court in one case, Al Shimari v. CACI
International Inc.," 6 has taken an entirely different approach, holding that
the mandate of Kiobel is not to engage in case-specific determinations but
to apply a bright-line rule against the exercise of jurisdiction in every case
where the conduct complained of took place in a foreign country."'
In Al Shimari, Iraqi citizens brought suit against a Delaware corporation
headquartered in Arlington, Virginia."' The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant corporation, an American defense contractor that provided,
among other things, civilian interrogators for the United States military,
had engaged in various wrongful acts: "torture[;] civil conspiracy to commit
torture[;] aiding and abetting torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment; and war crimes.""' When the Supreme Court handed down
Kiobel, the court in Al Shimari stayed all pending motions and directed the
parties to submit briefs on the effect of the Supreme Court's decision. 20 The
plaintiffs in their motion "invite[d] the Court to interpret Kiobel to hold
that the presumption against extraterritoriality [could] be sufficiently
displaced by their claims' sufficient connection with the United States.
Indeed, Plaintiffs ma[d]e much of the 'touch and concern' language
contained in the final paragraph of the Kiobel opinion ... "121 The court,
however, was not convinced; it held that the presumption against
presumption against extraterritorial application' may confer jurisdiction for ATS claims
arising out of conduct occurring abroad." (alteration in original)); Mwani v. Bin Laden, No.
99-125 (JMF), 2013 WL 2325166 at *4 (D.D.C. May 29, 2013) ("[Tlhe question before me
today is whether the events that occurred in and around the grounds of the United States
Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya on August 7, 1998, 'touched and concerned' the United States
with 'sufficient force' to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the
ATS."); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Queen Elizabeth II, No. 5:13-CV-103-RS-CJK, 2013 WL
2242459 at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2013) ("South African apartheid does not 'touch' or
'concern' the United States in such a way that would overcome the ATS's presumption
against extraterritoriality.").
115. See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 12-CV-30051-MAP, 2013 WL 4130756 at
*13-14 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013); Mwani v. Bin Laden, No. 99-125 (JMF), 2013 WL 2325166
at *4 (D.D.C. May 29, 2013).
116. Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 1:08-CV-827 (GBL/JFA), 2013 WL 3229720 (E.D. Va.
June 25, 2013).
117. Id. at *8.
118. Id.at*2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *4.
121. Id. at*8.
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extraterritoriality should apply in every case without a judicial inquiry into
the facts of the specific case.122
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court in Kiobel properly analyzed the ATS under the rule from
Morrison, but the lower courts have largely misunderstood Kiobel's holding
because they have not understood the rule from Morrison. A proper
understanding of both of those decisions as well as of the history of the ATS
reveals that Kiobel's language of "touch and concern" does not mandate a
case-by-case analysis on the issue of extraterritoriality. Not once, in the
nearly two-hundred-year silence between the ATS's promulgation in the
Judiciary Act and the Second Circuit's resurrection of the statute in
Filartiga, had the courts exercised jurisdiction under the ATS over conduct
occurring entirely within the boundaries of a foreign nation.'23 Kiobel is the
Supreme Court's first decision under the ATS in light of the presumption
against extraterritoriality-the rule of statutory construction that the
Supreme Court reaffirmed in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.'24
Morrison involved a suit by foreign plaintiffs against "foreign and American
defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign
exchanges."' 25 The Court had to determine whether § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act applied to such misconduct.'26 The Court held that § 10(b) of
the Act did not apply extraterritorially because of the presumption against
such a statutory interpretation.'27 The Court's holding is clear in two
regards that are relevant here: first, the presumption applies in all cases
where a statute is brought to bear on extraterritorial conduct; and second,
the presumption may only be rebutted by clear and affirmative statutory
122. Id. ("The Supreme Court [in Kiobel] makes clear that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is only rebuttable by legislative act, not judicial decision.").
123. See Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 862 (D. Md. 1961)
(exercising jurisdiction over the act of "withholding ... a minor child from the custody of the
parent" while on United States soil); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (stating in
dicta that jurisdiction could be exercised over conduct that occurred in the territorial waters
of the United States).
124. Morrison v. Nat'1 Australia Bank Ltd. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) ("'[Ulnless there
is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to give a statute extraterritorial
effect, 'we must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions."' (quoting
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991))).
125. Id. at 2875.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2883.
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language. With both of these principles established, the only logical
explanation for Kiobel's "touch and concern" language is that it speaks not
to how or whether the presumption may be rebutted by specific facts, but to
whether it is even implicated in a particular case.
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Applies in All Cases Where
a Federal Statute Is Brought to Bear on Extraterritorial Conduct
The Supreme Court's decision in Morrison and its application of that
decision in Kiobel both demonstrate that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to all federal statutes where the allegedly violative
conduct took place abroad. In making its determination on this issue, the
Court in Morrison announced that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies in "all cases."' 28 The Court reasoned that such a
bright-line rule was necessary to protect against the "results of judicial-
speculation-made-law." 29 The result of the bright-line rule would be that,
"[r]ather than guess[ing] anew in each case[,]" the court would simply apply
the presumption in every case and thus "preserv[e] a stable background
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects."' Thus, the
very rationale of the presumption itself militates against any kind of case-
by-case determination-the presumption applies in every case.
The Court's holding in Kiobel applies to all cases under the ATS because
it applies to the ATS itself; therefore, every case under the ATS should be
subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality regardless of the facts
of the specific case. The Court in Kiobel held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS and that nothing in the
statute itself rebuts the presumption.'"' In other words, no claim may be
brought under the ATS that alleges a violation of the law of nations based
upon extraterritorial conduct.
128. Id. at 2881.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) ("We therefore
conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS,
and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.").
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B. The Presumption May Only Be Rebutted by Clear and Affirmative
Statutory Language
The Court in Morrison was clear that the presumption against
extraterritoriality may only be rebutted by clear evidence of an affirmative
intention by Congress that the applicable statute have extraterritorial
reach.132 The Court in Morrison held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, and
the Court was clear as to the focus of its analysis: the determinative evidence
for whether the applicable statute could apply extraterritorially was the
statute itself."' As § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act contained no
clear evidence of an affirmative legislative intent for extraterritorial
application, the Court held that it had none.3 4
The Court in Kiobel likewise held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to the ATS and could only be rebutted if "the ATS
... evince[d] a 'clear indication of extraterritoriality."""s This in itself
dispels the theory that the Court endorsed a case-by-case test for
extraterritoriality; the Court said that for the ATS to apply extraterritorially
the text of the statute itself would need to demonstrate that legislative
intent-and the Court held that it did not. The entire focus of the Court's
analysis was on legislative intent; and for evidence of that intent, the Court
looked to "the text, history, and purposes of the ATS.""' At no point in the
Court's analysis did it consider whether certain facts of the specific case
before it could "rebut" the presumption. Every reference in the Court's
132. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 ("Thus 'unless there is the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed' to give a statute extraterritorial effect, 'we must presume it is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions.'" (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244,248 (1991))).
133. Id. at 2883 ("[T]here is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b)
applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not." (emphasis added)).
134. Id.
135. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883).
136. Id. (emphasis added). The Court found that "nothing in the text of the statute
suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized under it to have extraterritorial
reach," id., "[nior d[id] the historical background against which the ATS was enacted," id. at
1666, nor did the purpose behind the passage of the ATS indicate that it was "passed to make
the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms."
Id. at 1668.
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opinion to rebutting the presumption accompanied a reference to legislative
action, not case-specific inquiries.'
Further evidence of the nature of Kiobels holding in this regard is found
in the Court's reliance on Morrison. As noted by the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia in Al Shimari, the Morrison Court "took note of
the Second Circuit's 'north star' approach of judicially weighing the
'conduct' and 'effects' of securities cases to determine whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality was sufficiently rebutted."' This
"north star" approach is almost indistinguishable from the case-by-case,
fact-specific inquiry that some courts have imputed to the Kiobel
decision.139 The court in Al Shimari noted that "Morrison expressly rejected
the Second Circuit's view of the presumption's operation ... namely that
rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality is for a court to
'discern' rather than for Congress to legislate." 40 As the Al Shimari court
rightly discerned, "Kiobel did not qualify, modify, or limit Morrison or its
disapproval of judicial guessing as to the presumption's applicability, but
rather heavily relied upon it in extending the presumption to the ATS."l41
C. The Touch and Concern Language of Kiobel Refers Not to Whether the
Presumption Is Rebutted, but to Whether the Presumption Is Even
Implicated
In the final paragraph of Kiobel, the Court proffered the enigmatic
"touch and concern" language that has confounded so many lower courts. If
the "touch and concern" language of Kiobel does not espouse a case-by-case
method for extraterritoriality under the ATS, then what is its purpose? It is
clear from a careful reading of Kiobel, as well as that Court's reliance on
Morrison, that the "touch and concern" phrase did not create an exception
to the presumption against extraterritoriality in the context of the ATS; it
137. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. See also Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc.,
1:08-CV-827 (GBL/JFA), 2013 WL 3229720 at *8 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013) ("Nowhere in the
Kiobel decision does the Court explicitly state or even suggest that the facts of a case should
or could, under certain circumstances, inform a court's judgment about whether the
presumption is sufficiently rebutted and thus displaced.").
138. Al Shimari, 1:08-CV-827 GBL/JFA, 2013 WL 3229720 at *9.
139. Id. ("Thus, Plaintiffs' argument that this Court should engage in a judicial factual
determination here is demonstrably flawed in that it suggests an approach similar to the
Second Circuit's 'north star' approach.").
140. Id.
141. Id.
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noted the inevitability of courts facing factual scenarios where some
conduct had occurred abroad and some had not, and the court's need in
those cases to decide whether the presumption against extraterritorial
application was even implicated. The point of contention itself, the final
paragraph of Kiobel, also offers much guidance on this issue.
First, throughout the majority's opinion in Kiobel, the Court used
variations of the word "rebut" to determine if the text of the ATS would
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality;'4 2 however, in the last
paragraph of its opinion, the Court chose to use a different word:
"displace.""' It cannot be presumed that the Court simply used two
different words to describe the same thing.
Second, the sentences around the word "displace" offer clarity as to its
meaning. The Court's very next two sentences stated that "[c]orporations
are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that
mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise,
a statute more specific than the ATS would be required."'" The first
sentence plainly predicts a case where a plaintiff brings a claim under the
ATS based upon conduct occurring abroad but asserts that the court should
exercise jurisdiction because the defendant corporation does business or is
incorporated in the United States. The domestic nature of the defendant,
and perhaps even some domestic conduct by that defendant, would
essentially be a pretext for the plea that the court adopt an extraterritorial
application of the ATS. The next sentence confirms this interpretation; the
Court has definitively held that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to the ATS and that if Congress wants an ATS equivalent that
applies to non-domestic conduct, it must enact one.s45
Third, and perhaps most importantly, when the Court in Kiobel asserted
the "touch and concern" language, it cited to a specific portion of the
Morrison decision. Although Kiobel does not quote Morrison directly on
this point, the section cited includes compelling evidence as to the true
nature of the "touch and concern" language. The cited section includes the
beginning of the final section of the Morrison decision, which addresses the
142. The majority opinion in Kiobel used the word "rebut" four times and the word
"overcome" once in its analysis of whether the ATS overcame the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665-69 (2013). In
contrast, the Court used the word "displace" only once in the entire majority opinion, and
that was in the last paragraph. Id. at 1669.
143. Id. at 1669.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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petitioners' argument in that case that the presumption against
extraterritoriality was simply not implicated. In other words, the petitioners
there argued that even conceding that the presumption did apply to the
Securities and Exchange Act, it did not harm their particular case because
they sought "no more than domestic application anyway."'46 The Court
distinguished this assertion contesting implication from an assertion
contesting application of the presumption saying, "This is less an answer to
the presumption against extraterritorial application than it is an assertion-
a quite valid assertion-that that presumption here (as often) is not self-
evidently dispositive, but its application requires further analysis."'47 The
Court then offered a metaphor that echoes quite clearly in the fmal
paragraph of Kiobel: "the presumption against extraterritorial application
would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever
some domestic activity is involved in the case."' In other words, courts
should not entertain pretextual claims of "some" domestic conduct, when
the claim is primarily concerned with foreign conduct. The Court in Kiobel
merely echoed this principle when it stated that "even where the claims
touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application."'49 Thus, the "touch and concern" language relates to whether
the presumption against extraterritoriality is dispositive of a particular case,
and not to whether a particular statute has evidenced the requisite
legislative intent necessary to rebut the presumption.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF ATS LITIGATION
For now, the future of ATS litigation lies in the interpretations by the
lower courts of the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel. The court in Al
Shimari divined the true nature of Kiobers holding when it stated, "The
Supreme Court makes clear that the presumption against extraterritoriality
is only rebuttable by legislative act, not judicial decision."'s To read the
court's decision any other way would rob all meaning from much of the
146. Morrison v. Nat'1 Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
147. Id. at 2884.
148. Id.
149. Kiobel, 130 S. Ct. at 1669.
150. Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 1:08-CV-827 GBL/JFA, 2013 WL 3229720 at *8 (E.D.
Va. June 25, 2013).
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opinion."' If Kiobel requires an across-the-board application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality in every case and without any regard
for the facts of specific cases, then there is only one logical meaning left for
the enigmatic "touch and concern" language-it recognizes that the courts
will have to discern in some cases whether the claim is truly domestic, and,
thus, not at odds with the presumption, or whether "the activity forming the
focal point of congressional concern occurred overseas.""5
The Supreme Court has spoken, and the message is clear. It matters not
how many lower courts have misapplied or even totally failed to apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality by entertaining a case-specific
method because the courts "have no warrant to ignore clear statutory
language on the ground that other courts have done so."l53 Courts
addressing the applicability of the ATS should abstain from recognizing
causes of action for extraterritorial conduct unless and until Congress
provides for it by statute. Congress has already demonstrated its willingness
to provide causes of action for use by international-human-rights
plaintiffs, 154 and, as the Court in Kiobel stated, if Congress wishes to provide
151. The court in Al Shimari noted four specific references in Kiobel that evidenced the
need for a legislative determination on the issue of extraterritoriality:
First. [sic] Kiobel framed its discussion by stating that "[w]hen a statute gives
no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none," suggesting
that the text of the statute itself, rather than any judicial factual determination,
must rebut the presumption. Second, Kiobel stated that "to rebut the
presumption, the ATS would need to evince a clear indication of
extraterritoriality," again using language directed at the statute itself. In
concluding this portion of the analysis, the Kiobel Court again stated that
"nothing in the statute rebuts [the] presumption." Third, the Court commented
that a statute more specific than the ATS would be required if Congress
intended courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims predicated on
extraterritorial acts. Fourth, Kiobel explains that the presumption serves to
maintain the respect of those matters committed to other branches, such that
"the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that
carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political
branches."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
152. Id. at*10.
153. Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259,1268 (2011).
154. In 1991 Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act, which provides for the
"protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from an
individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing." TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT
OF 1991, PL 102-256, March 12, 1992, 106 Stat 73. The notes of decision indicate that one of
the crucial differences between the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) is
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for jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts in violation of the law of nations, "a
statute more specific than the ATS [will] be required." 5
that the "ATS is [a] jurisdiction conferring statute, [whereas the] TVPA provides [a] cause of
action." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West).
155. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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